Description
I make a pragmaticist argument for the assumption of absolute, universal, ultimate, objective moral reality. This is a pragmaticist argument because it follows the lines of Charles S. Peirce's argument for physical reality and scientific progress. Pragmaticists must make the assumption of moral reality because, in certain important moral dilemmas, we can argue that one set of norms is better than another only if there is an absolute, universal, ultimate objective set of norms. Essentially, absolute, universal, ultimate objective moral reality, though understood only fallibly, is the only measuring tool sufficient for claims of deep moral progress. The Deweyan pragmatist thinkers that I consider each attempt to replace absolute, universal, ultimate objective moral reality with some other form of objectivity in morality as a basis for this type of progress. I argue that there is no substitute for absolute, universal, ultimate objective moral reality to serve as the measuring tool for deep moral progress. Ironically, I enlist Richard Rorty to defend my position on this point, while also showing that his claims of progress are insufficient. However, I will obviously go further than Rorty by asserting that the solution to the problem is to appeal to the assumption of moral reality. He and others already listed would undoubtedly object that the appeal to the assumption of moral reality has usually had negative consequences for the well-being of society. The difference between my appeal to absolute moral reality and the historical appeal is that my appeal is to an admittedly fallible understanding of that reality. Thus, my appeal allows for tolerance of the views of others whenever possible while retaining the ability to condemn certain acts on absolute terms in spite of any existing cultural mores. I close the thesis with a consideration of Jürgen Habermas' discourse ethics. I argue that discourse ethics alone is insufficient for deep moral progress in some cases, but when one first assumes that moral reality exists, discourse ethics becomes a procedure for arriving at a fallibly held moral consensus which would eventually approximate Peirce's ideal limit of inquiry.
