Recent interest in the relation between Levinas and Kierkegaard has indicated similarities regarding their critique of philosophy, account of transcendence, and promotion of a separated subjectivity. Despite these similarities, Levinas critiques Kierkegaardian thought of endorsing egoism and violence. There is wide support for the position that Levinas's critique of Kierkegaard is based on a misunderstanding, and many point to the authored Works of Love as a text that eradicates or greatly mitigates Levinas's concerns. I contend that Levinas's concern over Kierkegaard in light of his own ethical project is merited and cannot be relegated to an instance of friendly fire or explained away by the supposition that Levinas is merely a bad reader of Kierkegaard, failing to distinguish between pseudonymous and authored texts. To show Levinas's critique of Kierkegaard can be justified, I outline the basic ethical project of Levinas in Totality and Infinity, consider his criticism of Kierkegaard, examine Fear and Trembling (the work of Kierkegaard's that Levinas most frequently criticizes) and examine the authored Works of Love. Initially Works of Love does appear to dispel Levinas's concerns since renunciation of the self is promoted, contesting the claim of egoism, and an emphasis on love opposes the "violence" of the Godrelation. However, residue of Levinas's concerns regarding Kierkegaardian thought remains in Works of Love. This residue leaves the text, and Kierkegaardian ethics, open to the reproof of Levinas's initial criticisms and is found primarily in the "as yourself" aspect of the love command, the salvation of the religious individual, and God's position as the "middle term" or mediator between individuals.