It has been argued that Epicurus was a reductionist with regard to the mind. It has also been argued that Epicurus is a non-reductionist with regard to the mind. The proper assessment of Epicureanism as a reductive or non-reductive theory has widespread implications for its plausibility as a working account of the mind, closely tied to the implications and plausibility of reductionism and non-reductionism themselves. Using research done in contemporary philosophy of mind, I evaluate the views of two scholars of Epicureanism, Julia Annas, a proponent of the idea that Epicurus was a non-reductionist, and Tim O'Keefe, a proponent of the idea that Epicurus was a reductionist. After evaluating these two views, I again use the contemporary research in philosophy of mind to guide my own interpretation of the Epicurean fragments, arguing that not only is there evidence to think that the Epicureans were non-reductionist, but even that they maintained a primitive form of what philosophers of mind may call an "emergentist" view of mental properties. Despite the claims made by Annas, O'Keefe, and myself, I end this work with a brief note on the plausibility of emergentism and non-reductionism, arguing that they are unusable as working theories, and that all of the consequences of reductionism, for better or for worse, remain.