Description
Software hacking has become a prominent practice since the rise of household and office electronics, with oil and healthcare companies recently falling victims to ransomware. Thus, it is logical to find ways to protect against data bridging. A less notorious but equally dangerous form of hacking has been on the rise; this attack focuses on the hardware rather than inflicting the victim with malware. It is known as side-channel attack (SCA). SCA is a specific type of attack which aims to steal intellectual property instead of holding a network hostage. It is performed by tapping into any external pin a chip may have, such as output or power source, to read and decode the information gathered. Using simple tools, like an oscilloscope, a perpetrator can read the seemingly random signals at an external pin. By obtaining many samples, the information going through the circuit can be deciphered. For example, a digital-to-analog converter (DAC) displays different current signals at both the power source and ground connections when pushing through different high or low values. At a glance, these signals may look like random noise but if an array of data is observed it becomes evident that high and low values cause distinct patterns of current signals at P/G that can be used to deduce the value that is being pushed through the circuit. This paper will provide proof that SCA is possible by including different circuits and simulations that show the current patterns at the potentially external pins and their corresponding values. Afterwards, solutions such as using lower operating power and data independent components to protect against SCA will provided and analyzed in detail.
