In Spurious Interest, Bonding Light, and Divine Offspring, I defend and further develop a line of exegesis of Plato's Republic that is rooted in a proposed distinction between the good and the idea of the good. I will argue that this distinction—a definitive feature of the metaphysical/epistemological scheme in the Republic—explains Socrates' apparent treatment of the good as both beyond and within the scope of the intellect. In Chapter 1, I will begin by providing a brief introduction to my overall argument, along with a brief exposition of my exegetical strategy in light of the peculiar difficulties Plato's use of the dialogue format poses to his readers (i.e. the Platonic Question). Chapter 2, I will begin by providing a careful analysis of the sun analogy in which I argue that Socrates not only distinguishes between the good and the idea of the good, but also covertly identifies the latter as the offspring of the former (in contrast to the consensus view that the offspring of the good is the sun). In Chapter 3, I will provide further support for the conclusions reached in the previous chapter by examining several of Socrates' comments on the good and the idea of the good in book 7. In Chapter 4 I will provide an analysis of the higher stages of the philosopher kings' education program that is rooted in a comparison with Diotima's erotic education in the Symposium, and draws on an analysis of comments Socrates makes about the good, the idea of the good, and beauty in certain key passages from the Republic, the Symposium, and the Phaedrus. In Chapter 5 I will develop a Hesiodic exegesis of the final stage of the education program that Socrates develops for the philosopher kings, drawing on comments Socrates makes in the Cratylus about Hesiod's Tale of Uranus, Cronus, and Zeus in the Theogony. In Chapter 6 I show how the metaphysical/epistemological scheme that Socrates develops in the Republic might be used to strengthen a general case for theism within the context of contemporary philosophy of religion.