This thesis is a defense of Martin Heidegger’s analysis of death in Being and Time against the deflationary arguments made by Paul Edwards in Heidegger and Death. In his text, Edwards argues that Heidegger’s evaluation of death in Being and Time is either false, but interesting, or true, but obvious, and thereby trivial and uninsightful. In this thesis I evaluate three important sections of Edwards’ text: 1. The Alleged Loneliness of Death; 2. The Untransferability of Death; and 3. Being-towards-death. I argue that Edwards’ analysis must be rejected on the grounds that he does not show clear understanding of the ontological difference and of fundamental distinctions between authenticity and inauthenticity. While he claims that Heidegger’s analysis of death is either false, but interesting, or true, but obvious, it is rather the case that Edwards’ straw-person arguments, not Heidegger’s, are weak and fallacious. In defending Heidegger’s argument I explain how death individualizes Dasein, the importance of taking responsibility for one’s life so that one can live authentically, and many implications that lead to a deeper understanding of some influential concepts that shape human existence, concepts like finitude, death, and fate.